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ABSTRACT
It is crucial for corporations operating in a multinational economy to have a seamless understanding of the security process.
For information assurance, ISO 15408:1999 (i.e. Common Criteria) and ISO 17799:2000 are the key standards, both of which
are needed for implementing a global approach to security.  They provide a definition of the necessary elements of the
process as well as the basis for authoritative certification.  However, the standards are entirely different in focus. The former
is product-oriented while the latter is strategic and organizational. That divergence is an obstacle to creating secure
enterprises and it causes disagreement about the meaning and value of the certifications. Mapping the relationship between
ISO 15408 and ISO 17799 demonstrates their strengths and weaknesses and encourages organizations to use these standards
effectively.  The results of our study indicate that while there are overlaps between these two standards, there are also
significant gaps.
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INTRODUCTION
Information assurance involves technology, people and processes. Each has a discrete role and each contributes differently to
the ultimate goal of securing the organization.  The assurance process blends the most effective factors from each domain
into a single effective response.  Ideally, the outcome is multi-faceted and holistic, meaning that every conceivable threat is
addressed by an appropriate countermeasure.
Adequate protection requires adopting the right set of security practices, which typically requires specialists’ expertise.
Accordingly, the most practical way to achieve this is by the process outlined in Figure One:
Figure 1:  Fundamental Components of Practical Information Assurance
The box labeled “Expert Advice” denotes the fact that the collective body of knowledge can be tapped to provide
recommendations  about  the  best  way  to  do  something.  When  a  best  practice  is  formally  documented,  it  is  known  as  a
standard or model.  The box labeled “Security Requirements” highlights the fact that all requirements of the security situation
must be satisfied, a situation known as information assurance.  Information assurance is embodied through some form of
infrastructure that contains sufficient detail to allow workers to understand how to perform tasks.  Figure Two illustrates how
expert advice and the requirements of the situation combine to produce that tangible outcome.
Expert Advice
(about Best
Practice)
Security
Requirements
(of a Given
Situation)
Planned
Infrastructure
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Figure 2:   Relationship of the Concepts of Best Practice and Governance to Infrastructure
The embodiment of the information assurance scheme is a documented security infrastructure. This infrastructure is the
means to transform expert advice into practical, day-to-day organizational security behavior. In order to accomplish this, the
generic best practices specified in the expert model have to be adapted to the specific environment,  a process known as
tailoring or customization.  Tailoring creates a tangible, complete and rational set of procedure specifying all necessary
security functions down to the level of explicit tasks. The end product conveys the exact form of the assurance process (e.g.,
assigned activities) to every employee.
There are two globally recognized models of expert advice. The first one is ISO/IEC 17799:2000 Information Technology -
Code of Practice for Information Security Management and the second one is ISO/IEC 15408:1999, popularly known as the
Common Criteria1.  The former is the world’s standard for implementing large-scale information security management
systems (ISMS) whereas the latter is the international standard for evaluating the security functionality embedded within IT
products and systems.  Both models provide advice about information protection and both serve as the basis for formal
certification.
While ISO17799 contains general advice about organizational security, the recommendations of the Common Criteria are
detailed and focus on specifying the functions necessary to judge the trustworthiness of Information Technology products and
systems.  These differences in scope between ISO17799 and ISO 15408 are problematic because they are not universally
accepted and employed in their appropriate domains.
There are financial, societal, and regulatory issues impacting standards implementation.  Perceived or real costs associated
with standards implementation can weigh heavily in any decision to implement ISO 17799 or ISO 15408.  Corporate culture
and the strategic approach to information security are philosophical factors influencing standards implementation.
Differences between European and United States regulatory cultures and governmental mandates also impact the role and
adoption of standards.  European Union (EU) countries and Pacific Rim nations favor use of ISO/IEC 17799 as the basis for
organizational security system formulation (OECD, 2004).  The EU utilizes the ITSEC (Information Technology Security
Evaluation  Criteria)  for  product  certifications  whereas  in  the  United  States,  ISO  17799  is  rarely  used.   In  the  U.S.,  the
Generally Accepted Information Security Principles (GAISP) or the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development) security domains— embodied in the International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium
(ISC2) (and even some NIST2 standards)— are the basis for security system formulation.  U.S. companies generally prefer the
Common Criteria as the standard advice about product evaluations.
Wylder (2004) comments on the small number of U.S. companies committed to developing a comprehensive information
security program.  This situation originates from a lack of understanding of the value of information security in the post 9/11
environment.  Wylder lauds those companies that understand the crucial relevance of information security in the global
environment as well as its root in the core of the business.   The fiduciary responsibility of executive management compels
leaders to demonstrate how the organization is attentive to standards compliance and implementation.
Wylder cites the technical fixation prevalent in many corporate settings.  The problem here is one of perception and mindset,
where security personnel and business persons alike tend to focus on the technical view of information security.  This myopic
vision reduces broader considerations of security to shorter-term views of immediate solutions, product features and
1 These two names (ISO 15408 and Common Criteria) are used interchangeably.  This paper uses the Common Criteria,
Version 2.1, August 1999.
2 National Institute of Standards and Technology
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implementation.  Wylder understands that properly informed business and security professionals perceive information
security as more than an appendage to the core business drivers.
Organizations may adopt specific standards without a firm commitment to the spirit of the standard, without which they
cannot gain ongoing benefits of continuous improvement (Spafford, 2003).  This philosophy mitigates against adoption of
ISO 17799 when companies persist in developing and implementing market-driven, ad-hoc policies and standards, typically
without an appreciation for those advanced by international bodies (Ross, 2001).  But the solution is more than a simplistic,
blind adoption of a standard such as ISO 17799.  Walsh (2002) notes that the loose structure and vagueness of ISO 17799
might lead an organization into a false sense of security.
  Organizations are not limited to scratch-built security constructs.  By combining standards’ best practices with specific
business knowledge, firms can develop policies that combine security with business needs (Berg, 2004).  Hurley (2003)
suggests that it is wise to adopt a strategy where only one risk assessment covers all regulations.  Such standards’ adoption
can yield credibility to the processes, technologies, and controls key to an information security environment (Moulton, 2004).
Caralli & Wilson (2004) chide organizations where the mindset relegates information security to the information technology
department or to substitute compliance with regulations for an intentional security strategy.  The reasons they cite for this
problem include the perception that information security is simply overhead or subject to a purely technical approach.  These
perceptual problems are common, they conclude, because information is too closely associated with the hardware that stores,
transports and processes it.   Ross (2004) argues that ISO 17799 is severely limited by its conceptual focus and failure to
account for technologies that drive risks.  He concedes that ISO 17799 can help determine if an organization is secure insofar
as it helps define security by use of metrics.
METHODS
The mapping methodology between ISO 15408:1999 (the source document) and ISO 17799:2000 (the target document) is
conceptual-literary.  This entails a qualitative rather than a strictly quantitative analysis.  Reading the narratives of each
standard and then comparing/contrasting involves subjective assessment.  Biases arise from a researcher’s interpretive
understanding of the practical and functional differences between the standards.  Consequently, the mapping schema could
vary based on a researcher’s understanding of the similarities and differences between the standards.
Each standard is organized in a hierarchal structure of four levels.  The first two levels of each standard are the highest levels
whereas levels three and four are more detailed.  In ISO 17799, level one consists of principles.  A principle is a grouping of
control objectives (level 2) that share a common focus.  The control objectives are further defined by elements (level 3), some
of which are further defined by even more detailed elements (level 4).
In  ISO 15408,  a  class  (level  1)  is  a  grouping of  security  requirements  that  share  a  common focus;  members  of  a  class  are
referred to as families. A functional family (level 2) is a grouping of security functional requirements that share security
objectives but may differ in emphasis or rigor; the members of a family are referred to as components.  Components (level 3)
are a specific set of security requirements that are constructed from elements (level 4).  Components are the smallest
selectable set of security requirements and may be ordered to represent increasing strength or capability.
Mapping is performed in two layers: 1)  a high-level map, (level one and two); and 2) a detailed-level map (level three and
four).  The high-level map compares the first two levels of ISO 15408 (classes and families) with the first two levels
(principles and control objectives) of ISO 17799.  The detailed-level map compares the last two levels of ISO 15408
(components and elements) with the last two levels (elements and detailed elements) of ISO 17799.
The mapping is not always one-on-one because ISO 17799 operates at a higher level than the Common Criteria.  ISO 17799
was broken down at each level into smaller bits called information requirements.  Items at all levels in ISO 15408 were then
mapped to the information requirements.  No level from ISO 15408 covers a level in ISO 17799 completely.  In a few cases,
a component or element will map to an information requirement at a higher level in ISO 17799.  For the most part, ISO
15408 components and elements were excluded from the mapping because of their granularity. Due to space constraints, the
detailed mapping is not presented.  The table below depicts the relationship between the two standards.
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SOURCE DOCUMENT TARGET DOCUMENT
ISO 15408:1999 PART 2 ISO 17799:2000
Map
Level
Level Title Total Level Title Total Map
Level
1 Class 11 1 Principle 10High
Level 2 Family 67 2 Control Objective 36
High
Level
3 Component 136 3 Element 127Detailed
Level 4 Element 250 4 Detailed Element 11
Detailed
Level
Table 1:  Relationship between ISO 15408 and ISO 17799
RESULTS
All of the ISO 15408 functional and assurance requirements are either directly or indirectly related to the ISO 17799 control
objectives, but most only partially fulfill the objective.
The areas of ISO 17799 with the highest match are:
* Security policy – ISO 17799 requires that organizational security policies provide references to more detailed security
policies for specific systems.  ISO 15408 requires that the organizational security policies relevant to the IT product or
system are listed in the Protection Profile.   ISO 15408 does not address how or when these polices should be reviewed.
* Asset classification –  Asset management (identification, classification and assessment) is a key component of an
information security management system and of evaluating a Protection Profile (PP) or Security Target (ST).  ISO 15408
does not explicitly address the BS 7799 Information Security Management System Requirements but it does require this
information for input into the evaluation criteria.
* Access control – Both ISO 17799 and ISO 15408 address the access policy and rules.  ISO 15408 does not address the
allocation, administration, and storage of passwords, user’s responsibilities or access to unattended user equipment.
* System development and maintenance – The security requirements analysis and specification and change management
embodied in ISO 17799 are fulfilled in ISO 15408.  However, the Common Criteria does not address technical reviews,
outsourced software development or modifications to commercial off-the-shelf software (COTS).
The areas of ISO 17799 with limited match are:
* Personnel – Personnel security is addressed as an assurance requirement for EAL level three and up and in a Protection
Profile or Security Target evaluation. The assurance requirements of ISO 15408 address the threats and countermeasures
regarding personnel.  The security roles addressed in the functional requirements are dependent on the allocation of
security responsibilities required in ISO 17799. ISO 15408 does not explicitly address personnel screening,
confidentiality agreements, education and training, or the human response to security incidents.
* Communications and operations – ISO 15408 only partially addresses this area with audit trail, segregation of duties, fail
safe mechanism, network control and nonrepudiation and cryptography.  “The robustness of cryptographic algorithms or
even which algorithms are acceptable is not discussed in the [Common Criteria (CC)].  Rather, the [CC is] limited to
defining requirements for key management and cryptographic operations” (Herrmann, 2003 p. 11).  ISO 15408 does not
address system planning and acceptance, facilities management, document security, media handling, or information in
non-IT physical transport.
* Compliance -  While ISO 15408 partially addresses security audits, privacy, and user data protection, it does not address
legislation, Intellectual Property Rights, or organizational records.
The areas of ISO 17799 with little to no match are:
* Organizational security – ISO 15408 does not address the organizational infrastructure, third-party access or outsourcing.
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* Physical security – “Physical security is addressed in a very limited context, that of restrictions on unauthorized physical
access to security equipment and prevention of and resistance to unauthorized physical modification or substitution of
such equipment” (Hermann, 2003, pg. 11).  ISO 15408 does not address secure areas outside of development, general
physical security controls, equipment accessories or disposal and reuse of equipment.
* Business continuity - While ISO 15408 addresses fail safe mechanisms in IT products, it does not address the business
processes surrounding disasters and security failures.
DISCUSSION
Both ISO 17799 and ISO 15408 clearly state that they are neither isolated nor all inclusive.  They are intended to be used in
conjunction with other guidelines.  Users of either standard are encouraged to decide which controls and requirements will be
used or extended.  As part of a larger information security management system, both standards agree that selection of control
objectives or security requirements be based on the business objectives of the organization. The Common Criteria lists
several items that are considered out of its scope but are addressed in ISO 17799.  Two of them are highlighted below.
Personnel Security
The disparity between the two standards regarding personnel security is alarming.  According to the 2004 e-Crime Watch
Survey,  current  or  former  employees  or  contractors  were  cited  as  a  close  second to  hackers  as  the  greatest  cyber  security
threat.  The survey shows 36% of respondent organizations experienced unauthorized access to information, systems or
networks by an insider compared to 27% committed by outsiders.   The 2004 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey
indicated that respondents from all sectors do not believe that their organization invests enough in security awareness.  As
Kevin Henry notes, “Properly trained and diligent people can become the strongest link in an organization’s security
infrastructure.   However, while a machine will enforce a rule it does not understand, people will not support a rule they do
not believe in.  The key to strengthening the effectiveness of security programs lies in education, flexibility, fairness, and
monitoring (2004, pg. 663).”
Compliance
The 2004 e-Crime Watch Survey advised that among policies and procedures, conducting regular security audits are the most
effective method to combat e-crime.  However, the 2004 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey found that the use of
security audits is far from universal.  The CSI/FBI survey noted that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) is having an impact on
some industries, but the majority of respondents in other sectors reported that SOX did not raise the level of interest in
information security or shift the focus from technology to corporate governance.
Rasmussen (2003) cites the complexities of managing and validating compliance to a confusing variety of regulations and
standards.  His solution is to distill requirements down to a common, taxonomic base.  Rasmussen cites the need for this
reduction simultaneously paired with an understanding of the elements common to all the standards, which then can be
mapped back to individual standard/regulation. (Rasmussen, 2003).
CONCLUSION
Explicating the relationship between ISO 17799 and ISO 15408 provides a foundation for understanding the variant
conceptual territory of these international standards. The outcome of this comparison offers a means for distinguishing the
places of common agreement as well as where the gaps lie.  This is critically important for security personnel as well as high-
level decision makers pursuing a unified approach to security problems.
Failure to adopt a worldwide vision of security creates the potential for miscommunication and misunderstanding of biblical
proportions within the multinational security community.  Lack of unification underscores the problem of disparate standards
and practices.  A solution is to adhere to a harmonized set of universally accepted recommendations utilized by corporations
to underwrite security activities. As a first step in that process, we have attempted to understand how ISO 17799 and the
Common Criteria fit together.  We believe that this understanding is the essential first step for getting a common global
definition of security. These are the only two major standards promulgated by ISO, which is the world’s standard’s body.  So,
any worldwide initiative starts with them.
If one country adopts a governance vision of security and another adopts a functional requirements view (and the gap can be
demonstrated), we have the potential for highly insecure products because we will be integrating components developed on
two incompatible security schemes.  The governance approach is likely superior because it is the basis for tailoring out
explicit architectures whereas the Common Criteria approach is not as amenable to associations outside the functional
requirements.  The Common Criteria are manifestly incomplete (against the recommendations of 17799) and therefore more
likely to represent a short-sighted security approach.  Businesses interested in assessing the feasibility of standards
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implementation must know the relationship between standards, including knowledge of any gaps or overlaps between
standards.  This marks the initial rationale for why a map of the standards is necessary.  Once armed with an understanding of
what the standards can and cannot address, CIOs and other information security decision makers are then better able to
launch more formal cost/benefit analyses.
APPENDIX:  MAPPING DETAILS
Scope limitations preclude expansion of the Mapping Details.  It is recommended that the reader obtain a copy of both ISO
17799 and the Common Criteria to facilitate understanding and implementation of information security.
ISO 17799 3.0 Security Policy
Match Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 3.1 Information security policy is partially addressed in ISO 15408:
FDP_ACC Access control policy
FDP_IFC Information control policy
ADV_SPM Security policy modeling
APE_ENV.1.3C Protection Profile security environment
ASE_ENV.1.3C Security Target security environment
Gap Analysis
ISO 17799 element 3.1.2 Review and evaluation of security policy document is not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 4.0 Organizational Policy
Match Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 4.1 Information Security Infrastructure is partially addressed in ISO 15408:
FMT_SMR Security management roles
Gap Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 4.1 Information Security Infrastructure is mostly not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 control objective 4.2 Security of third-party access is not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 control objective 4.3 Outsourcing is not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 5.0 Asset Classification and Control
Match Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 5.1 Accountability for Assets and 5.2 Information Classification is addressed by ISO 15408:
APE_DES Protection Profile Target of Evaluation (TOE) Description
ASE_DES Security Target of Evaluation Description.
Gap Analysis
ISO 17799 Asset Classification and Control is not covered specifically in ISO 15408 functional or assurance requirements,
nor is it required for any of the evaluation assurance levels. It is only required in the Target of Evaluation Description of the
Protection Profile evaluation and the Security Target evaluation.
ISO 17799 6.0 Personnel Security
Match Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 6.1 Security in Job Definition and Resourcing is partially addressed in the ISO 15408:
APE_ENV.1.1C Protection Profile security environment
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ASE_ENV.1.1C Security Target security environment
ALC_DVS Development security
Gap Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 6.1 Security in Job Definition and Resourcing is partially not addressed in ISO 15408:
ISO 17799 control objective 6.2 User Training is not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 control objective 6.3 Responding to security incidents and malfunctions is not addressed in the ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 7.0 Physical and Environmental Security
Match Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 7.1 Secure areas are partially addressed in ISO 15408:
ALC_DVS Development security
ISO 17799 control objective 7.2 Equipment security is partially addressed in ISO 15408:
FPT_PHP Target of evaluation security function (TSF) physical protection
Gap Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 7.1  Secure areas is mostly not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 control objective 7.2. Equipment security is mostly not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 control objective 7.3  General controls is not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 8.0 Communications and Operations Management
Match Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 8.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities are partially addressed in ISO 15408:
ACM Configuration Management (8.1.2)
FAU_SAA security audit analysis (8.1.3)
FAU_ARP security audit automatic response (8.1.3)
FAU_GEN Security audit data generation (8.1.3)
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage (8.1.3)
FMT_SMR security management roles (8.1.4)
ISO 17799 control objective 8.4 Housekeeping is addressed in ISO 15408:
FPT_FLS Fail secure
FPT_ITA Availability of exported TSF data
FPT_ITI Integrity of exported TSF data
FRU Resource utilization
ISO 17799 control objective 8.5 Network management  is partially addressed in ISO 15408:
FDP_UCT Inter-TSF user data confidentiality transfer protection
FDP_UIT Inter-TSF user data integrity transfer protection
FPT_ITI Integrity of exported TSF data
FPT_ITC Confidentiality of exported TSF data
FPT_ITA Availability of exported TSF data
FPT_SSP State synchrony protocol
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FPT_TDC Inter-TSF TSF data consistency
ISO 17799 control objective 8.6 Media handling, Security of system documentation, is partially addressed in ISO 15408:
FDP_ACC Access Control Policy
FDP_IFC Information Control Policy
ADV Development
AGD Guidance documents
Mapping Note
This mapping is implicit. While ISO 15408 does not address the security of the document itself, it does contain sensitive
information about the system that would be protected under ISO 17799.
ISO 17799 control objective 8.7 Exchanges of information and software is partially addressed in ISO 15408:
FCO Communication
FCS Cryptographic Support
FIA Identification and authentication
Gap Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 8.1 Operational Procedures and Responsibilities is partially not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 control objective 8.2 System planning and acceptance is not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 control objective 8.3 Protection against malicious software is not explicitly addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 control objective 8.4 Housekeeping is partially not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 control objective 8.5. Network management is partially not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 control objective 8.6 Media handling and security is mostly not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 control objective 8.7  Exchanges of information and software is mostly not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 9.0 Access Control
Match Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 9.1 Business requirement for access control is addressed in ISO 15408:
FDP_ACC Access control policy
FDP_ACF Access control functions
FMT_SMR Security management roles
APE_DES Protection Profile Evaluation, Target of Evaluation (TOE) Description
ASE_DES Security Target Evaluation, Target of Evaluation (TOE) Description
FIA Identification and authentication
FMT_SAE Security attribute expiration
FTA Target of Evaluation access
ISO 17799 control objective 9.3 User responsibilities, Password use  is partially addressed in ISO 15408:
FIA_SOS.2  Generation of secrets
ISO 17799 control objective 9.4 Network access control  is mostly addressed in ISO 15408:
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FDP_ACC Access control policy
FDP_ACF Access control functions
FTP Trust path/channels
FIA Identification and authentication
FCS Cryptographic Support
ISO 17799 control objective 9.5 Operating system access control  is partially addressed in ISO 15408:
FIA Identification and authentication
FTA Target of Evaluation access
ISO 17799 control objective 9.6 Application system access control  is partially addressed in ISO 15408:
FDP_ACC Access control policy
FDP_ACF Access control functions
FDP_IFC Information Control Policy
FDP_IFF Information Control Functions
FMT_SMR Security management roles
APE_DES Protection Profile Evaluation, Target of Evaluation (TOE) Description
ASE_DES Security Target Evaluation, Target of Evaluation (TOE) Description
ISO 17799 control objective 9.7 Monitoring system access and use  is partially addressed in ISO 15408:
FAU Security audit
APE_DES Protection Profile Evaluation, Target of Evaluation (TOE) Description
ASE_DES Security Target Evaluation, Target of Evaluation (TOE) Description
FPT_STM Time stamps
Gap Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 9.3 User responsibilities is partially not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 control objective 9.4 Network access control  is partially not addressed in ISO 15408:
ISO 17799 control objective 9.5 Operating system access control  is partially not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 control objective 9.6 Application system access control  is partially not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 control objective 9.7 Monitoring system access and use  is partially not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 control objective 9.8 Mobile computing and teleworking  is not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 10.0  Systems Development and Maintenance
Match Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 10.1 Security requirements is addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 15408:1999 Part 2 Functional Requirements
ISO 15408:1999 Part 3 Assurance Requirements (including evaluations for Protection Profile, Security Target, and
Target of Evaluation)
ISO 17799 control objective 10.2 Security in application systems  is addressed in ISO 15408:
FDP_RIP Residual information protection
FDP_ITT Internal Target of Evaluation (TOE) Transfer
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FDP_ROL Rollback
FDP_SDI Stored data integrity
FRU Resource utilization
FCS Cryptographic support
FDP_UIT Inter-TOE-Security-Function (TSF) user data integrity transfer protection
FDP_ETC Export to outside TSF control
ISO 17799 control objective 10.3 Cryptographic controls  is addressed in ISO 15408:
FCS Cryptographic Support
FCO Communication
ISO 17799 control objective 10.4 Security of system files  is partially addressed in ISO 15408:
FMT Security management
FAU_GEN Security audit data generation
FAU_SEL Security audit event selection
FDP_ACC Access control policy
FDP_ACF Access control functions
FDP_RIP Residual information protection
FPT_AMT Underlying abstract machine test
FPT_SEP Domain Separation
FPT_TST Target of Evaluation Security function self-test
ISO 17799 control objective 10.5 Security in development and maintenance  is partially addressed in ISO 15408:
ALC_LCD Lifecycle definition
ACM Configuration management
ATE Tests
AVA_CCA Covert channel analysis
ADO Delivery and operation
Gap Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 10.4 Security of system files  is partially not addressed in ISO 15408:
ISO 17799 control objective 10.5 Security in development and maintenance  is partially not addressed in ISO 15408:
ISO 11.0 Business Continuity Management
Match Analysis
None
Gap Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 11.1 Aspects of business continuity is not addressed in ISO 15408.
ISO 17799 12.0 Compliance
Match Analysis
ISO 17799 control objective 12.1  Compliance with legal requirements is partially addressed in ISO 15408:
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FAU Security audit
FDP User data protection
FCS_CKM Cryptographic key management
FPR Privacy
ISO 17799 control objective 12.2  Reviews of compliance is partially addressed in ISO 15408:
APE_ENV Protection Profile security environment
ASE_ENV Security Target, security environment
ATE Tests
ISO 17799 control objective 12.3  System audit considerations is addressed in ISO 15408:
FAU Security audit
Gap Analysis
BS 7799-2:1999 3.0 Information Security Management System Requirements
Match Analysis
BS 7799 control objective 3.2 Establishing a management framework is partially addressed in ISO 1508:
APE_ENV Protection Profile security environment
ASE_ENV Security Target, security environment
Gap Analysis
BS 7799 3.0 Information Security management system requirements is mostly not addressed in ISO 15408.
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